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INSURANCE: ELIMINATION OF THE PHYSICAL CONTACT
REQUIREMENT FROM UNINSURED MOTORIST
COVERAGE IN FLORIDA
Brown v. ProgressiveMutual Insurance Co., 249 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1971)
Petitioner was involved in an automobile accident in which he was
forced off the road and into an abutment by an unidentified "hit-and-run"
driver. No physical contact occurred between the hit-and-run vehicle and
petitioner's automobile. Petitioner sought compensation for his injuries from
his insurer, but his claim was denied because his policy required physical
contact with the hit-and-run vehicle for recovery. Contending the policy provision violated Florida Statutes, section 627.0851,1 the petitioner instituted an
action against his insurer. The circuit court granted summary judgment
3
2
for petitioner, but the First District Court of Appeal reversed. On certiorari
the Supreme Court of Florida reversed the district court and HELD, the physical contact requirement in the insurance policy endorsement restricted
Florida's uninsured motorist statute 4 and was thus void as against public
policy.5
The uninsured motorist statute requires automobile liability insurance
policies to provide coverage for accidents involving other motorists not
carrying insurance. 6 The public policy declared by the statute provides that
1. FLA. STAT. §627.0851 (Supp. 1970) provides in part:
"(1) No automobile liability insurance . . . shall be issued . . . with respect to any
motor vehicle registered ... in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental
thereto . . . for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to
recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily
injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom; provided, however, that the
coverage required under this section shall not be applicable where any insured named in
the policy shall reject the coverage ....
"(2) For the purpose of this coverage the term 'uninsured motor vehicle' shall, subject
to the terms and conditions of such coverage, be deemed to include an insured motor
vehicle where the liability insurer thereof is unable to make payment with respect to the
legal liability of its insured within the limits specified therein because of insolvency.
"(3) Nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent any insurer from affording
insolvency protection under terms and conditions more favorable to its insureds than is
provided hereunder."
2. Progressive Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 229 So. 2d 645 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
3. Brown v. Progressive Mut. Ins. Co., 249 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1971), Certiorari was based
on conflict jurisdiction. FLA. CoNsT. art. V, §4 (2). The case providing the alleged conflict
was Butts v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 207 So. 2d 73 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968). The
dissent argued that Butts provided no conflict with the instant case because it did not
turn upon the physical contact requirement. 249 So. 2d at 431 (Dekle, J., dissenting).
4. FLA. STAT. §627.0851 (Supp. 1970).
5. 249 So. 2d at 430.
6. FLA. STAT. §627.0851 (1) (Supp. 1970). Florida's recently enacted "no-fault" automobile insurance statute, Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 252, does not eliminate the requirement for
uninsured motorist protection. The new statute, while making automobile insurance mandatory, exempts from tort liability only those vehicle owners who in fact obtain insurance
in compliance with the act. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 252, §8 (1). The 1971 legislature
strengthened FLA. STAT. §627.0851 (1969), the uninsured motorist provision. Fla. Laws
1971, ch. 88.
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every insured is entitled to recover under his own policy for the amount of
damages he would have been able to recover if the uninsured tortfeasor had
maintained liability insurance. 7 An increasing number of automobile collisions,8 coupled with the inability of a large number of tortfeasors to pay
damages, 9 has dearly demonstrated the desirability of a mode of compensating
innocent automobile accident victims.
The protection afforded by the uninsured motorist statute, however, does
not expressly extend to instances where the offending driver's identity, and
thus his insurance status, is unascertainable. By definition, a hit-and-run
driver is one whose identity cannot be ascertained. 10 Prior to the instant case,
Florida courts had consistently excluded hit-and-run drivers from the class
of "uninsured motorists."' 1 The view, however, has been maintained that a
hit-and-run driver should be considered an uninsured motorist within the
statutory definition because his victim needs compensation as much as the
2
victim of a known, but uninsured, tortfeasor.
Despite the controversy over whether a hit-and-run driver is an uninsured
motorist, standard insurance endorsements provide coverage for hit-and-run
accidents under the uninsured motorist provision, 3 but only if bodily injury
to the insured arose from actual physical contact between the insured and the
hit-and-run vehicle.' 4 The purpose of the contact provision is to protect the
insurer from the sham claims of individuals who, through their own negligence, injure themselves without the presence of another vehicle and then
seek recovery on the grounds that the accident was caused by a hit-and-run
driver.' 5

7. Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Gavin, 184 So. 2d 229 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
8. See Note, Automobile Insurance Crises, 42 PA. B.Q. 405 (1971).
9. Note, Uninsured Motorist Coverage in Florida, 14 U. FLA. L. R V.455 (1962).
10. E.g., Lawrence v. Beneficial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 8 Ariz. App. 155, 157, 444 P.2d 446,
449 (Ct. App. 1968); Walsh v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 91 Ill.
App. 2d 156, 161, 234
N.E.2d 394, 398 (Ct. App. 1968).
11. E.g., Raspall v. Beneficial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 226 So. 2d 465 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969);
Cruger v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 So. 2d 690 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
12. See generally Note, The Requirement of a "Hit" for Coverage Against Hit-andRun Drivers Under Uninsured Motorist Statutes and Policy Endorsements, 20 S.C.L. REV.

790 (1968).
13. See, e.g., 229 So. 2d at 646-47: "'[H]it-and-run automobile' means an automobile
which causes bodily injury to an insured arising out of physical contact of such automobile
with the insured or with an automobile which is insured at the time of the accident provided: (1) there cannot be ascertained the identity of either the operator or the owner of
such 'hit-and-run automobile'; (2) the insured or someone on his behalf shall have reported
the accident within 24 hours to a police, peace, or judicial officer or to the Commissioner
of Motor Vehicles, and shall have filed with the company within 30 days thereafter a statement under oath that the insured or his legal representative has a cause or causes of
action arising out of such accident for damages against a person or persons whose identity
is unascertainable, and setting forth the facts in support thereof; and (3) at the company's
request, the insured or legal representative makes available for inspection the automobile
which the insured was occupying at the time of the accident."
14. Id.
15. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Spinola, 374 F.2d 873, 875 (5th Cir. 1967).
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The standard endorsement would not allow recovery under the facts of the
instant case, where the hit-and-run driver caused the accident without colliding with the insured. Therefore, while the insurer would have allowed
recovery beyond the literal requirements of section 627.0851,16 petitioner in
the instant case sought to recover where there was no physical evidence of
the existence of a tortfeasor. Petitioner supported his claim against his insurer
by asserting that the term "uninsured motorist," undefined in section 627.0851,
included all tortfeasors from whom the victim could not recover, either because the tortfeasor was uninsured or because the tortfeasor could not be
found and his insurance status was undetermined. 17 The present court accepted this reasoning and held that the insurance policy unnecessarily restricted the terms of section 627.0851, because the policy required physical
contact before a hit-and-run driver was included in the insurance policy
definition of "uninsured motorist." i s
The contention that an "uninsured motorist" includes hit-and-run drivers
where no physical contact has occurred has previously been considered by
several district courts of appeal. 19 In Cruger v. Allstate Insurance Co. 20 the
Third District Court of Appeal upheld the contact requirement in an insurance policy. Similar results were reached in Mutual Automobile Insurance
22
Co. v. Spinola21 and Raspall v. Beneficial Fire & Casualty Insurance Co.
In Raspall the court further held the physical contact requirement did not
restrict section 627.0851.23 Moreover, the court observed that the policy
provision actually broadened the statutory coverage.2 4 Cases decided in other
states are substantially in accord with the general rule that physical contact
must have occurred between the hit-and-run vehicle and the insured before
recovery is allowed under the uninsured motorist provision.25
An important factor influencing the court in the instant case was the large
number of cases in which insurance contract exclusions have been asserted to
attempt to preclude recovery for innocent victims.26 Florida courts have

16. See text accompanying notes 11-15 supra.
17. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 7-9.
18. 249 So. 2d at 430. See National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters Family Protection
Coverage (Automobile Bodily Injury Liability) No. A6156, Jan. 1, 1963 (1963 Standard
Form).
19. E.g., Cruger v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 So. 2d 690 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
20. Id.
21. 374 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1967).
22. 226 So. 2d 465 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
23. Raspall v. Beneficial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 226 So. 2d 465, 467 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
24. Id.
25. E.g., Lawrence v. Beneficial Fire 8cCas. Ins. Co., 8 Ariz. App. 152, 444 P.2d 446
(Ct. App. 1968); Frager v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 155 Conn. 270, 231 A.2d 531 (1967);
Prosk v. Allstate Ins. Co., 82 Ill. App. 2d 457, 226 N.E.2d 498 (Ct. App. 1967); Roloff v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 191 So. 2d 901 (Ct. App. La. 1966); Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 70 Wash. 2d 587, 424 P.2d 648 (1967).
26. E.g., First Nat'l Ins. Co. of America v. Devine, 211 So. 2d 587 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968)
(voiding a limitation of the uninsured coverage to drivers over age 25); Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co. v. Mason, 210 So. 2d 474 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968) (voiding an exclusion of
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indicated they will strike down any provision in an insurance contract that
defeats the intent and purpose of the uninsured motorist statute. 27 The instant court has similarly construed the uninsured motorist statute as broadly
as possible to protect innocent victims of automobile accidents.
The instant decision places the emphasis on proof rather than upon
relatively arbitrary requirements imposed by and for the benefit of the insurance industry.28 The advantages of the court's decision to innocent victims
far outweigh the possible increase in spurious claims. The court emphasized
that the burden of proof is upon the claimant to show that the accident did
occur as alleged.2 9 Since the physical contact requirement is no longer a
condition precedent to recovery, the victim of a hit-and-run accident who
has sufficient proof that there was a negligent tortfeasor will not be refused
recovery because of an arbitrary tedmicality in an insurance contract. The
insured will be able to purchase coverage that will protect him when the
tortfeasor, known or unknown, is unable to pay damages.
The instant case provides a dear example of a judicial decision based
upon social awareness. The court stated that the "statute is designed for the
protection of injured persons, not for the benefit of insurance companies or
motorists who cause damage to others." 3° This decision reflects a desire on
the part of the court to allow an individual to purchase protection sufficient
to prevent his becoming a financial burden on society through the irresponsible acts of hit-and-run drivers. 31 Furthermore, the instant case represents an
equitable results
additional step by the Florida supreme court toward reaching
32
enactments.
legislative
of
interpretation
through judicial
ELLIOT BORXSON

uninsured motorist protection to certain types of vehicles); Forbes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 210
So. 2d 244 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1968) (voiding a provision that excluded uninsured motorist
protection while the insured was on a public conveyance); Butts v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 207 So. 2d 73 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968) (voiding an exclusion providing that the insurer shall not be liable for losses while automobile is driven by son of insured); Traveler's
Indem. Co. v. Powell, 206 So. 2d 244 (1st D.CA. Fla. 1968) (dealing with the exclusion provision concerning coverage for two automobiles owned by a husband and wife).
27. E.g., Traveler's Indem. Co. v. Powell, 206 So. 2d 244 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
28. See also Aksen, Arbitration of Uninsured Motorist Endorsement Claims, 24 Omo
ST. L.J. 589, 602 (1963). At the time Mr. Aksen wrote this article he was serving as General
Counsel of the American Arbitration Association.
29. 249 So. 2d at 430.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Garner v. Ward, 251 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1971).
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